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ABSTRACT
This article investigates whether socially responsible companies
differ from other firms in the quality of earnings forecasts issued
by management. Specifically, using 5192 earnings forecast obser-
vations of 669 Chinese listed companies from 2010 to 2016, we
examine whether companies that perform better in corporate
social responsibility (CSR) still provide higher-precision manage-
ment earnings forecasts compared with companies with poor CSR
performance, thereby presenting an image of transparent and
accountable disclosures. Through empirical research, this paper
finds that CSR is positively associated with management forecast
precision. This result is robust to using alternative measures of
CSR, considering mandatory disclosure sample and voluntary dis-
closure sample, and controlling for potential endogeneity concern
by adopting the instrumental variable method. Furthermore, we
find the relationship between CSR and management forecast pre-
cision is stronger in non-state-owned firms. Our findings suggest
that socially responsible companies will comply with higher eth-
ical standards and hence maintain their well-established social
reputation by disclosing high-quality earnings forecasts, which
lends support to the transparent forecast hypothesis. This paper
enriches the existing studies regarding the economic consequen-
ces of CSR and adds empirical evidence from emerging markets.
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For the past few decades, the issue of CSR has attracted considerable attention from
the theoretical and practical communities. Meanwhile, CSR has become an important
strategic arrangement for most enterprises. Given the importance of CSR, a large
number of academic studies have explored the influence of CSR engagement on cor-
porate behaviors and outcomes. Most of the previous literature focuses on the link
between CSR and firms’ financial performance (e.g., Cavaco & Crifo, 2014; Kim &
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Oh, 2019; Orlitzky et al., 2003; Pava & Krausz, 1996; Skare & Golja, 2012; Surroca
et al., 2010; Waddock & Grave, 1997; Wang et al., 2016). Other studies investigate
the relationships between CSR and earnings management, cash holdings, financing
costs, stock price crash risk, investment efficiency, consumer perceptions, and con-
sumer loyalty, etc. (e.g., Benlemlih & Bitar, 2018; Cheung, 2016; Garcıa-Pozo et al.,
2019; Goss & Roberts, 2011; Kim et al., 2012; 2014; Servera-Frances & Piqueras-
Tomas, 2019; Sevilla-Sevilla et al., 2019).
The current article is centered on the relationship between CSR and the quality of
management earnings forecasts. Concretely, our paper mainly investigates whether
companies with better CSR performance (i.e., CSR-oriented companies) attach more
importance to management forecast precision, thereby releasing more precise man-
agement earnings forecasts. According to existing research (Ben-Amar & Belgacem,
2018; Kim et al., 2012), we view CSR-oriented companies as those that actively engage
in responsible economic and social activities to meet the ethical and social expecta-
tions and the reasonable interests of diverse stakeholders (including shareholders,
creditors, employees, suppliers, customers, government, communities, etc.). We
choose management forecast precision as the main research object, first, because
managers have great discretion over it and they can decide the earnings forecast pre-
cision issued to external stakeholders, and second, because forecast precision directly
determines the information content and quality of earnings forecasts, which can play
a vital role in the decision-making and behaviors of various stakeholders (Cheng
et al., 2013).
CSR and management earnings forecasts are two crucial topics in theoretical
research and practical fields. Especially in recent years, enterprises have begun to
attach great importance to their CSR while pursuing economic interests. Meanwhile,
due to the influence of the market mechanism, increasingly more listed firms release
earnings forecasts. Nevertheless, research efforts in the two major fields are conducted
independently, and academic researchers pay little attention to the connection
between them. However, this research question is vital and worth exploring by schol-
ars since forward-looking information that reflects the company’s future performance
is more useful and decision-making value to stakeholders such as investors and cred-
itors than historical financial information (Hirst et al., 2008).
The association between CSR and management forecast precision can be explained
by transparent forecast hypothesis and opportunistic forecast hypothesis. Based on
stakeholder theory, academic researchers put forward the transparent disclosure
hypothesis, that is, the management of socially responsible companies tends to dis-
close more transparent and informative financial information to demonstrate their
commitments to business ethics and maintain the company’s good reputation for
social responsibility (Freeman, 1984; Gelb & Strawser, 2001; Jones, 1995; Kim et al.,
2012; Lee, 2017; Scholtens & Kang, 2013). On the contrary, the opportunistic disclos-
ure hypothesis in the framework of agency theory argues CSR performance is likely
to be negatively related to corporate disclosure transparency under the assumption
that corporate executives’ engagement in CSR-related initiatives is driven by oppor-
tunistic motivations, that is, under the veil of CSR, managers conceal their self-inter-
est pursuits or unethical behavior through vague or opaque information disclosures
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(Ben-Amar & Belgacem, 2018; Lee, 2017; Prior et al., 2008). So, the nexus between
CSR and management forecast precision is really an empirical question that needs us
to examine.
Employing a sample consisted of 5192 earnings forecast observations from 669
Chinese A-share listed firms between 2010 and 2016, we conduct empirical tests and
find strong evidence that a firm’s CSR performance is positively related to the preci-
sion of earnings forecasts issued by its management. This outcome fully reveals that
companies with better CSR achievements will probably provide more precise earnings
forecasts. Our finding confirms that CSR orientation has a salient positive effect on
the quality of management earnings forecasts. This result accords with our transpar-
ent forecast hypothesis that corporate executives hope to offer a more precise pro-
spect of the firm’s forthcoming performance in keeping with their social
responsibility image for the purpose of maintaining or enhancing companies’ over-
all reputation.
The main result is robust to using alternative measures of CSR, considering man-
datory disclosure sample and voluntary disclosure sample, and controlling for poten-
tial endogeneity concern by adopting the instrumental variable method. In addition,
given China’s special institutional background and transitional economic system, the
difference in corporate ownership types (i.e., state-owned and non-state-owned own-
ership) may have an influence on the association between CSR and the quality of
management forecasts. Accordingly, we further investigate the differences in the
above nexus under different types of corporate ownership. Through empirical
research, we find that CSR plays a greater role in improving management forecast
precision in non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) as compared to state-owned
enterprises (SOEs). This result may be because the information disclosure quality of
China’s non-SOEs is generally low (Durnev et al., 2009; Masanori, 2010; Tang et al.,
2017) and as a result, the role of CSR in enhancing disclosure quality is more obvi-
ous. Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen the CSR orientation and social responsi-
bility consciousness of private enterprises so as to further the level of information
disclosure and increase information transparency.
The contributions of this paper lie in the following aspects. First of all, our
research enriches the literature on the economic consequences of CSR, especially add-
ing to the new evidence about the impact of CSR on corporate information disclo-
sures. Existing literature regarding CSR and corporate information disclosures focuses
on the impact of CSR on the quality of reported earnings that reflects a company’s
historical earnings (e.g., Ben-Amar & Belgacem, 2018; Bozzolan et al., 2015; Hong &
Andersen, 2011; Kim et al., 2012). We differ from these previous studies and are con-
cerned about the effects of CSR on the quality of firms’ expected earnings which are
more decision-relevant and play a more crucial part in the course of stakeholders’
decision-making than reported earnings to a large extent. Distinct from reported
earnings, management earnings forecasts convey forward-looking information regard-
ing the firm’s future operating situation and performance change trend, which
improves the fairness of access to information for stakeholders such as external
investors and creditors. In particular, the precision of management forecasts directly
reflects the informativeness and transparency, which is more helpful to assess whether
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managers develop the reputation for disclosing transparent and value-relevant infor-
mation in response to their CSR image. Hence, this article sheds new light on the
research concerning CSR and the quality of financial information disclosure and
broadens our knowledge of the impacts of CSR on management forecast behaviors.
Second, the disclosure of forecasting information is of importance to various stake-
holders, but its quality is more vital. However, compared with the research on the
forecast motivation and consequence, there is a lack of research with respect to the
characteristics of management earnings forecasts, especially about the contributing
factors of their qualitative characteristics (Hirst et al., 2008). Among the qualitative
characteristics of forecasting information, forecast precision is more easily controlled
by managers (Cheng et al., 2013). Yet, only a few studies have explored the determi-
nants of management forecast precision (e.g., Baginski & Hassell, 1997; Cheng et al.,
2013; Choi et al., 2010). We expand the research in this field by showing the signifi-
cance of CSR in deciding management forecast precision, thus, answering the call for
more research on the qualitative characteristics of management forecasts (Hirst et al.,
2008). Furthermore, our paper also investigates under what circumstances the role of
CSR is weaker or stronger.
Third, this paper selects Chinese listed companies as a sample, including not only
the sample of voluntary disclosure earnings forecasts but also the sample of manda-
tory disclosures, which can substantially reduce the sample self-selection problem
caused by the earnings forecast samples of completely voluntary disclosure in previ-
ous literature. In this paper, the mandatory disclosure sample accounts for 93.91%of
the total sample, which is quite different from the voluntary disclosure sample in
prior studies, and thus our research can alleviate the problem of sample self-selection
in the studies which examine the relationship between the quality of voluntary dis-
closure and CSR. Moreover, our study extends the work of CSR and management
earnings forecasts by taking the linkage between the two academic issues into account
in China which is the largest emerging economy. The academic community believes
that emerging economies provide an interesting and valuable research context in
which both traditional research issues and unique phenomena can be investigated to
promote the development of academic research (e.g., Lau et al., 2016; Wright et al.,
2005; Xu et al., 2012). Therefore, this article ties together three areas of research: cor-
porate social responsibility, emerging economy, and management earnings forecasts,
finds the positive effect of Chinese companies’ CSR orientation on the quality of
management forecasts, and thus provides relevant evidence about emerging markets.
Finally, our research is beneficial to regulators who are more inclined to advocate
managers to issue more precise information about corporate future earnings (Choi &
Pae, 2011). By and large, our results are consistent with the expected goals of regula-
tory agencies, which aim to enhance the precision of information disclosures and
facilitate corporate responsibility to the entire society. Moreover, our study is also
helpful for investors to evaluate the transparency and informativeness of corporate
information disclosures. A growing body of research shows that management earn-
ings forecasts provide more information to investors than any other accounting
source (e.g., Beyer et al., 2010; Bozanic et al., 2018), and more precise forecasts gener-
ate stronger investor responses (Bamber & Cheon, 1998; Hutton et al., 2003). Thus,
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the results of this paper provide an important reference for investors to make reason-
able decisions.
The remainder of this article is arranged as follows. The second section describes
the institutional background of management earnings forecast in China. The third
part reviews the related literature regarding the impact of CSR on information dis-
closure quality and develops the research hypothesis of this paper on this basis. The
fourth section exhibits the data, empirical model and variables. The regression results,
empirical analysis and robustness test are presented in Section 5. Lastly, we discuss
the research results, summarize the conclusions of this paper, and point out future
research direction in Section 6.
2. Management earnings forecasts in China
Management earnings forecasts have existed for a long time and have attracted tre-
mendous academic focus. Since the SEC incorporated forward-looking information
into the US capital market information disclosure system in 1973, the earnings fore-
cast disclosed by the management has become one of the important means by which
most listed companies are able to convey information, adjust market expectations
(Ajinkya & Gift, 1984), and reduce disclosure or litigation costs (Skinner, 1994,
1997). A lot of research contends that management earnings forecasts issued by listed
companies have a large information content, which can provide crucial information
for the capital market and also enhance the disclosure reputation of listed companies,
and hence boost stock prices and reduce capital costs (Baginski et al., 1993; Beyer
et al., 2010; Coller & Yohn, 1997; Hutton et al., 2003; King et al., 1990; Pownall
et al., 1993).
As China is in the stage of an economic transition, relevant laws and regulations
are incomplete, and the awareness of information disclosure of listed firms is weak
(Ang et al., 2015; Du et al., 2016), which hinder the establishment and improvement
of the management earnings forecast system. Unlike fully voluntary earnings forecasts
in most countries, China has a semi-mandatory feature for listed firms’ management
forecasts, that is, public firms that meet certain characteristics (such as loss or turn-
around) have to disclose their management earnings forecasts (Gao & Wang, 2014;
Yuan et al., 2014). Although corporate managers have partial discretion in whether to
make earnings forecasts, they have considerable discretion over the forecast forms,
including point forecast, interval forecast, open-interval forecast, and qualitative fore-
cast. Similar to US companies, most of management earnings forecasts are interval
format with specific upper and lower estimate values in China (Cheng et al., 2013),
and the difference between the upper and lower estimate values (the opposite of fore-
cast precision) has a large variation among earnings forecasts.
The existing literature has found that earnings forecast precision has a significant
market reaction, specifically affecting stock returns, investor decision-making, and
analyst forecasts (Baginski et al., 1993; Kim & Verrecchia, 1991; Maines & McDaniel,
2000). More precise information provided by firms is more valuable and useful for
information users to make accurate judgments and informed decisions (Karamanou
& Vafeas, 2005; Kim & Verrecchia, 1991; Subramanyam, 1996). Investors will revise
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their assessments of managers’ reputation, if any, based on the earnings forecast
behavior they have observed by managers (Beyer & Dye, 2012). Overall, management
earnings forecast precision is crucial not only to shareholders’ investment decisions
but also to all stakeholders’ understanding of corporate operating and finan-
cial conditions.
3. Literature review and hypothesis development
3.1. Related literature
Based on our research theme, the literature most closely related to this paper is the
research in regard to the link between corporate social responsibility and the quality
of financial information disclosure. The existing research mainly examines the associ-
ation between CSR and accounting information quality from the perspective of earn-
ings management. Extant studies state that enterprises undertaking responsible
activities will adhere to the moral quality of honesty and integrity under the guidance
of social ethics and the incentive of reputation effects, which will reduce the
company’s earnings management behavior and thus improve the quality of account-
ing information. For instance, Chih et al. (2008) use cross-country data for empirical
research and find the evidence showing that companies with superior CSR perform-
ance are unlikely to manipulate corporate earnings, displaying lower smooth earnings
and lower probability of avoiding earnings decline. Hong and Andersen (2011)
choose corporate America as a sample to explore the relationship between CSR and
earnings management and find that CSR-oriented companies generally have fewer
earnings management activities, exhibit higher accruals quality and tend not to be the
subject of SEC investigations. Similarly, Kim et al. (2012) also take American listed
companies as a sample and find that companies that attach importance to social
responsibility often do not manage their earnings. Besides, using the data of Asian
countries, Scholtens and Kang, (2013) still draw a conclusion that socially responsible
enterprises tend not to involve in aggressive earnings management behavior. In add-
ition, prior research provides further evidence that a company with better social
responsibility performance is unlikely to conduct real earnings management practices
that are detrimental to corporate future performance (Bozzolan et al., 2015). Contrary
to this position, some theoretical researchers state that CSR will exacerbate the agency
problem of companies if managers opportunistically leverage CSR strategies to seek
private benefits (Martinez-Ferrero & Garcıa-Sanchez, 2015; Prior et al., 2008). Under
the framework of agency theory, a handful of studies find that there is a positive cor-
relation between CSR and earnings management (e.g., Gargouri et al., 2010; Prior
et al., 2008). Moreover, Gelb and Strawser (2001) confirm that CSR-oriented firms
are apt to disclose more extensive and more useful information to market participants
than firms that pay less attention to CSR. Ben-Amar and Belgacem (2018) find firms
that invest more in CSR actions are more prone to release complex and obscure
annual reports due to managers’ manipulation of disclosure readability for self-inter-
est purposes.
Taken together, the above literature focuses on the impact of a firm’s CSR orienta-
tion on the quality of historical financial information, little research pays attention to
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the role that CSR plays in the quality of forward-looking earnings forecasts. As far as
we know, Lee (2017) is the only article to explore the impact of CSR on management
forecast quality. But our study is markedly distinguishable from Lee (2017). First, our
focus is on management forecast precision, whereas he investigates management fore-
cast accuracy. Forecast precision and accuracy are two different quality characteristics
of management earnings forecasts. Compared with forecast accuracy, the management
has greater discretion and control over forecast precision, and they can choose to dis-
close earnings forecasts with different precision to external parties for certain motiva-
tions (Cheng et al., 2013). Thus, management forecast precision can better reflect
managers’ responsibility to their stakeholders in information disclosure. Second, fore-
cast precision can often generate significant market reactions (e.g., investors’ and ana-
lysts’ responses) when earnings forecasts are released, while the market reaction of
forecast accuracy cannot be effectively evaluated as forecast accuracy needs ex-post
verification by comparing forecast earnings with real earnings. Finally, based on the
setting of China, the largest emerging and transitional economy, the research we con-
duct is quite different from Lee (2017) that focuses on the American market because
the two economies have great dissimilarities in management earnings forecasts and
CSR performance of publicly listed companies. Therefore, this article enriches the
existing studies concerning the economic consequences of CSR and the determinants
of the earnings forecast quality.
3.2. Hypothesis development
Currently, CSR has gradually become an important dimension for stakeholders to
evaluate enterprises. Stakeholder theory holds that corporate executives have a moral
responsibility to meet the needs and interests of a broad class of stakeholder groups
so managers tend to comply with higher ethical standards in their interactions with
stakeholders to demonstrate corporate social responsibility (Donaldson & Preston,
1995; Freeman, 1984; Jones, 1995). Furthermore, CSR has increasingly become a stra-
tegic means for corporations to achieve competitive advantages (Garriga & Mele,
2004; Mohammadi et al., 2018; Porter & Kramer, 2002). CSR can help companies to
access external resources to gain competitive advantages (Costa-Climent & Martınez-
Climent, 2018; El Ghoul et al., 2017; Garriga & Mele, 2004; Martınez-Ferrero et al.,
2016). Specifically, CSR-oriented companies can earn a good social reputation, which
can develop long-term friendly cooperative relations and networks with their stake-
holders and obtain market, personnel, capital, goodwill, and other key resources that
are sources of competitive advantages through these social networks so as to achieve
sustained excellent financial performance (Bhattacharya & Sen, 2004; Cheng et al.,
2014; Godfrey et al., 2009; Goss & Roberts, 2011; Kim et al., 2012; Roberts &
Dowling, 2002; Turban & Greening, 1997). Hence, the favorable stakeholder relation-
ship generated by a company’s CSR engagement can give rise to positive effects on
financial performance and corporate value (Choi & Wang, 2009; Davis, 1960;
Godfrey, 2005; Lee, 2019). CSR has been viewed as an effective management strategy
and one of the most critical factors for business success (Cheng et al., 2014; Falck &
Heblich, 2007; Freeman et al., 2007). To this end, managers have incentives to meet
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the interests of their major stakeholders, which is also the socially ethical concern
advocated by CSR (Garriga & Mele, 2004; Jones, 1995). A new global survey of CSR
conducted by Adam Friedman Associates shows that establishing a favorable corpor-
ate reputation is the main motivator of CSR strategies, which is consistent with stake-
holder theory (Adam Friedman Associates, 2012).
Owing to information asymmetry between enterprises and their stakeholders,
meeting the information needs of stakeholders is the primary task that socially
responsible firms should do, and hence CSR-oriented firms will build a good reputa-
tion for transparency and responsible disclosure. Providing high-quality and more
informative disclosures is a responsible response to the information needs of key
stakeholder groups and the first step in ethical communication between corporate
managers and external stakeholders. The significance of high-quality management
forecast policies is generally regarded as a pre-commitment to decrease the informa-
tion asymmetry between corporate insiders and outsiders (King et al., 1990).
Compared with low-precision earnings forecast information, releasing high-precision
earnings forecasts can decrease information asymmetry more and send clearer signals
to information users, which will, in turn, lessen the uncertainty and risk faced by the
stakeholder groups. The existing literature finds that securities analysts have more
confidence in the course of forecasts when the precision of management forecasts is
higher (Libby et al., 2006). Overall, precise forecast information contributes to the
reasonable judgment and decision-making of stakeholders, which is in line with the
enterprise value maximization principle considering the interests of various stake-
holder groups. Such ethical communication also has potential benefits for the com-
pany. Corporate reputation mainly reflects stakeholders’ perceptions and evaluations
on a firm’s behaviors of providing valuable products or services (Fombrun, 1996).
Hence, issuing precise forecast information can promote firms to develop a good
reputation for transparent and responsible disclosure. As the literature documents, if
public companies intend to establish a favorable reputation for forecasting disclosure,
corporate executives would disclose more precise and unbiased information (King
et al., 1990). This reputation for transparent and responsible disclosure can lessen the
transaction cost caused by opaque disclosure, thereby helping to reduce the
company’s capital cost, increase the wealth of stakeholders and ultimately achieve
‘win-win’ outcomes (Cho et al., 2013; Jones, 1995; Miller & Bahnson, 2002), which
aligns with the long-term value maximization objective pursued by the CSR strategy
(Garriga & Mele, 2004). On the basis of mutual gains, the interaction between the
company and its stakeholders can be sustained (Costa-Climent & Martınez-Climent,
2018; Wagner-Tsukamoto, 2019).
If companies spend efforts and resources engaging in CSR-related initiatives to
improve the reputation for responsible and ethical behavior that represents the inter-
ests of stakeholders, they will continue to maintain and manage this good reputation.
This is because building a solid reputation is a difficult, expensive, and time-consum-
ing process. Moreover, the reputation is extremely vulnerable, and the firm’s minor
mistakes, such as unfairness, dishonesty, or other irresponsible behavior, will make all
of the efforts be in vain. Earnings forecast precision depends largely on the benefit
and cost of information production by the management (Baginski et al., 2004;
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Bamber & Cheon, 1998). Consequently, those firms with a good reputation tend not
to waste their past efforts and reputation-building investment due to opportunism
and short-term benefits and are more willing to continue their reputation investments
to sustain and earn more reputation effects (Jo & Kim, 2007; Telser, 1980).
Accordingly, CSR-oriented companies have strong incentives to act in a responsible
and moral manner because these actions are advantageous to them (Jones, 1995).
Therefore, companies that are superior in their social responsibilities are also inclined
to provide relatively precise management earnings forecasts to enhance the reputation
of transparent disclosure, which, similar to CSR, also reflects executives’ efforts to
build positive corporate reputation.
On the basis of the above theoretical analysis, we expect firms that are more
socially responsible will disclose higher-precision earnings forecasts than do firms
with poor CSR performance. This leads to the transparent forecast hypothesis:
H1a: Ceteris paribus, CSR is positively associated with management forecast precision.
According to agency theory, the existing literature on CSR and financial informa-
tion quality also finds that CSR activities can aggravate agency problems to a certain
extent, providing opportunities for managers to manipulate financial information dis-
closures to mask poor financial performance or their opportunistic behavior
(Hemingway & Maclagan, 2004; Martinez-Ferrero & Garcıa-Sanchez, 2015). Based on
the agency perspective, some empirical studies find that listed firms that invest more
in social responsibility projects have a great tendency to manage corporate earnings,
provide opaque financial reports, and thus cover up their real performance (Ben-
Amar & Belgacem, 2018; Gargouri et al., 2010; Martinez-Ferrero & Garcıa-Sanchez,
2015). Extant literature also finds that when managers exercise discretionary power in
the financial reporting process, they will participate in activities related to CSR as a
defensive tactic to avoid scrutiny and boycotts from stakeholders who may be affected
by manipulated financial information (Cespa & Cestone, 2007). This finding under-
pins the perception that an opportunistic manager often assumes that meeting the
interests of stakeholders and establishing an image of caring about society and the
environment can reduce the likelihood that they will be scrutinized and punished by
these stakeholders for manipulating information disclosure. CSR behavior has become
a powerful tool to win support from a wide range of stakeholders (Prior et al., 2008).
Therefore, those companies where managers have considerable discretion in making
decisions are more prone to over-invest in CSR actions to gain the support of key
stakeholders and divert attention from firms’ poor performance or managers’ miscon-
duct. As a consequence, managers may regard the exercise of CSR as entrenchment
strategies to conceal opportunistic motives (Martinez-Ferrero et al., 2016; Martinez-
Ferrero & Garcıa-Sanchez, 2015; Surroca & Tribo, 2008).
If the opportunistic motivation of the management dominates the information dis-
closure practice, there is likely to be a reverse relationship between firms’ CSR per-
formance and the precision of earnings forecasts, as managers of these companies
tend to try to mislead stakeholders’ perceptions with respect to corporate actual
financial performance through ambiguous or opaque earnings forecasts. Based on the
discussion of the opportunistic uses of CSR, we present a competing hypothesis about
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the relationship between CSR performance and earnings forecast precision, namely,
the opportunistic forecast hypothesis.
H1b: Ceteris paribus, CSR is negatively related to management forecast precision.
4. Research design
4.1. Data
Our paper selects the earnings forecasts issued by the A-share firms listed on Chinese
stock markets between 2010 and 2016 as the initial sample. Because the management
earnings forecast data in CSMAR (CSMAR, 2016) database are available beginning in
2010 and the available data on CSR data in RKS (Rankins CSR Ratings, 2016) data-
base is up to 2016. Drawing on the existing research practices (Cheng et al., 2013;
Huang et al., 2017; Li & Zhang, 2015; McGuinness et al., 2017), the initial sample is
screened and processed as follows: (1) removing financial and insurance firms
because they are subject to different regulatory and accounting standards from other
companies; (2) removing observations of qualitative forecasts and open interval fore-
casts whose precision cannot be measured following Cheng et al. (2013); (3) exclud-
ing the observations with missing CSR value because they are not available in the
RKS database; (4) deleting the observations with missing values of other control vari-
ables. The final sample size of CSR on management forecast precision is 5192. The
CSR data in this article comes from the RKS (Rankins CSR Ratings, 2016) database
that is an independent CSR rating agency, and other data are derived from the
CSMAR database that is extensively used by scholars to study the issues related to
Chinese listed companies.
4.2. Measurement of CSR
We rely on the RKS database to measure Chinese listed firms’ CSR performance, and
this method has been widely adopted in prior research (e.g., Chen & Wan, 2020;
Huang et al., 2017; Marquis & Qian, 2014; McGuinness et al., 2017; Pan et al., 2018).
As a professional and independent rating agency, RKS evaluates the CSR status of
Chinese A-share listed companies according to ISO 26000 Guidance and GRI (3.0)
and takes the Chinese characteristics into account. RKS conducts the rating by adopt-
ing four initial level indicators: macrocosm, content, technology, and industry.
Among them, the first three initial indicators also include a series of first-level indica-
tors and second-level indicators, which apply to all industries. For instance, under the
content level, there are six first-level indicators, including community participation
and development, consumers, operating fairness, environment, labor and human
rights, and economic performance. Under the first-level indicators, such as the envir-
onment, there are four second-level indicators, including environmental management
information, pollution prevention information, climate change mitigation and adapta-
tion information, and sustainable resource use information. Regard to the industry
indicator, a number of different industry-specific indicators are assigned to every
industry. Finally, an aggregate CSR rating varying from 0 to 100 is formed according
1776 X. CHEN ET AL.
to the values of those sub-indicators for each firm. This CSR score comprehensively
reflects how a company performs in CSR in a certain year.
4.3. Measurement of forecast precision
Referring to the methods of Johnson et al. (2001), Cheng et al. (2013), and Li and
Zhang (2015), we use the negative value of the width of earnings forecasts to measure
forecast precision. For the closed interval forecast, the forecast width is the difference
between the upper and lower estimates, scaled by the per-share price of the company
at the beginning of the fiscal year. For the point forecast, we treat its forecast width
as 0. Hence, a larger value of PRECISE means a higher degree of forecast precision.
4.4. Empirical models and measurements of control variables
To examine the hypotheses presented above, we construct the following multiple
regression model (1) to estimate and analyze the effect of CSR on management fore-
cast precision. Meanwhile, in this model, the industry and year fixed effects are also
controlled. Further, all the standard errors in the regression model are clustered by
firm to control the cluster effects. We mainly focus on the sign of CSR coefficient b1
in model (1). If the sign of b1 is positive, the result supports hypothesis H1a; other-
wise, the hypothesis H1b is endorsed.
PRECISE ¼ b0 þ b1CSRþ b2SIZEþ b3BM þ b4LEV þ b5ROAþ b6LOSSþ b7VOLR
þ b8RETURN þ b9COVERþ b10HORIZON þ b11ANNUALþ b12NEWS
þ b13SOEþ b14DUALþ b15INDRþ b16INST þ INDUSTRY þ YEARþ e
(1)
In the above model (1), PRECISE represents the precision of management earnings
forecasts, and the main explanatory variable CSR denotes the company’s overall CSR
performance level. Following the existing literature (Ajinkya et al., 2005; Cheng et al.,
2013), our paper also contains many essential control variables which probably affect
management forecast precision. Concretely, these control variables include corporate
size (SIZE), firms’ growth opportunities (BM, measured as book-to-market ratio),
corporate financial leverage (LEV), corporate financial performance (ROA), whether
firms’ actual earnings during the forecast period are negative (LOSS), stock returns’
volatility (VOLR), the stock return rate (RETURN), a dummy variable of annual
earnings forecast (ANNUAL), forecast horizon (HORIZON), news type (NEWS), and
the quantity of analysts following (COVER). Furthermore, considering the view that
effective corporate governance mechanisms are crucial to monitor managers’ behav-
iors and decisions (Garcıa-Sanchez et al., 2019), we also select a few representative
corporation governance variables as control variables, including corporate ownership
types (SOE), CEO duality (DUAL), the proportion of independent directors on the
board of directors (INDR), and the shareholding proportion of institutional investors
(INST). At the same time, we also control industry and year fixed effects, which are
represented by binary variables respectively. Table 1 shows more detailed definitions
and measures for each variable.
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5. Empirical results and analysis
5.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 displays the summary statistics for the variables that are included in our
main regression model. To mitigate the impact of outliers on our regression analysis,
all continuous variables are winsorized at1% and 99%. The mean value and standard
deviation of PRECISE are 0.096 and 0.275, respectively, which means there are great
variations in the precision of earnings forecasts for the sample firms. The mean and
median values of CSR are 39.516 and 37.569, respectively, whereas 1% and 99% of
CSR are 22.373 and 70.714, respectively, which means that CSR performance among
the sample firms is generally not good enough (based on the reason that the full
score of CSR rating is 100) and that there is substantial heterogeneity in the CSR per-
formance among our sample firms. The mean value of LOSS is 0.108, suggesting that
10.8% of the sample companies have a loss during the forecast period. The mean
value of ANNUAL is 0.359, which indicates that about 36% of earnings forecasts in
the sample observations are annual forecasts. The mean value of NEWS is 0.442, and
we can conclude that 44.2% of earnings forecasts receive a positive market reaction
from investors, and we classify these earnings forecasts as good news. Moreover, the
Table 1. Variable definitions.
Variable names Variable definitions
PRECISE PRECISE is measured by the negative value of the width of
earnings forecasts.
CSR CSR is the score obtained from the ratings published by RKS (Rankins CSR
Ratings) for sample firms.
SIZE SIZE is calculated as the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets.
BM BM stands for book-to-market value, measured by the ratio of a company’s
book value divided by its market value, and the greater the value of BM
means the lower the growth of the company.
LEV LEV is measured by a company’s total liabilities divided by its total assets.
ROA ROA is measured by a company’s net profit divided by its total assets.
LOSS It is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the actual net profit during the
forecast period is negative, and 0 otherwise.
VOLR VOLR denotes the volatility of stock returns, measured by the standard
deviation of stock returns in the year before the release date of the
earnings forecast.
RETURN RETURN stands for stock return rate, referring to the stock return for the year
before the date on which the earnings forecast is released.
COVER COVER denotes the number of securities analysts who follow the company.
HORIZON HORIZON is measured by the number of days between the release date of
earnings forecasts and the fiscal period end date.
ANNUAL It is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the earnings forecast is an annual
forecast, and 0 otherwise.
NEWS It is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the cumulative abnormal return
rate of firm stock is greater than 0 over the three-day window centered
on the earnings forecast day (i.e., good news), and 0 otherwise (i.e.,
bad news).
SOE It is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a firm’s ultimate owner is the
government or its agencies, and 0 otherwise.
DUAL DUAL denotes firm CEO duality, which is equal to 1 if the CEO also serves as
the company’s chairman, and 0 otherwise. Separation of the two positions
helps to maintain a balanced board without anyone has unfettered power.
INDR INDR denotes the proportion of the number of independent directors on the
board of directors.
INST INST stands for the proportion of the shares holding of institutional investors.
Source: Following existing literature.
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mean value of SOE is 0.438, which means that approximately 44% of the observations
come from state-owned enterprises.
5.2. Correlation analysis
Table 3 lists the Pearson correlation coefficient results among the main variables. The
results in Table 3 show that the correlation coefficient between PRECISE and CSR is
significantly positive at the 1% level, initially confirming hypothesis H1a (transparent
forecast hypothesis). All the correlation coefficients among independent variables are
below 0.62, indicating that multicollinearity does not constitute a concern for us in
the regression model since Gujarati (2009) holds that the model may not have severe
multicollinearity concerns if the correlation coefficients are not greater than 0.8. The
above results are only the correlation analysis between univariates, and further rigor-
ous empirical evidence will be presented in the multiple regression analysis below.
5.3. Multivariate regression results
Table 4 demonstrates the multivariate regression results of CSR’s impact on manage-
ment forecast precision. In Table 4, column (1) shows the regression results without
corporate governance control variables, and column (2) lists the regression results
after adding corporate governance control variables. It can be seen from the results of
these two columns that the regression coefficients on CSR are both significantly posi-
tive at the 1% level, which indicates that CSR performance is positively and signifi-
cantly related to the precision of management earnings forecasts after controlling
possible influencing factors. This positive relationship is in line with the proposition
of H1a (transparent forecast hypothesis), suggesting that managers release more pre-
cise earnings forecasts in companies with superior CSR performance. Our result
implies that CSR plays a crucial role in improving management forecast precision.
This is in accordance with the notion that for the investing public, the foremost social
responsibility of publicly listed companies is to provide transparent financial
Table 2. Descriptive statistics.
Variables Mean Std. Dev P1 P25 Median P75 P99
PRECISE –0.096 0.275 –1.611 –0.010 –0.003 –0.001 0.000
CSR 39.516 9.928 22.373 32.553 37.569 44.251 70.714
SIZE 22.646 1.340 20.216 21.659 22.444 23.552 26.063
BM 0.437 0.292 0.070 0.230 0.359 0.555 1.566
LEV 0.459 0.211 0.047 0.294 0.476 0.628 0.862
ROA 0.047 0.062 –0.140 0.011 0.039 0.077 0.240
LOSS 0.108 0.310 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
VOLR 0.030 0.010 0.015 0.023 0.028 0.035 0.059
RETURN 0.157 0.472 –0.524 –0.194 0.049 0.409 1.754
COVER 2.037 1.022 0.000 1.386 2.197 2.833 3.689
HORIZON 16.122 38.033 –31.000 –15.000 –3.000 63.000 74.000
ANNUAL 0.359 0.480 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
NEWS 0.442 0.497 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
SOE 0.438 0.496 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
DUAL 0.245 0.430 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
INDR 0.376 0.054 0.333 0.333 0.364 0.429 0.571
INST 0.069 0.096 0.000 0.017 0.044 0.078 0.560
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the RKSdatabase and CSMAR database.
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information since transparent and reliable information disclosures are not only
regarded as the prerequisite for effective and mutually beneficial communications
between firms and their stakeholders but also a measure of the ‘just’ and ‘fair’ treat-
ment to different stakeholders by a company (Holley, 1998; Ruppel & Harrington,
2000). Corporate managers have the discretion over the disclosure precision to exter-
nal stakeholders as they have inside information that is not available to outsiders
(Choi et al., 2010). Corporate executives in CSR-oriented companies have a greater
tendency to make more transparent disclosure decisions because they have an incen-
tive to be ethical and accountable in disclosure practices, whereas managers in com-
panies that don’t care about CSR may release less specific disclosures with the
purpose of misleading outside stakeholders’ judgment about the actual performance
of firms by issuing vague earnings forecasts.
Moreover, the regression results of the control variables in the model are basically
in line with our expectations. The larger the firm, the more difficult it is to precisely
forecast firm performance, resulting in lower precision of earnings forecasts, which is







































Note: T-values are reported in parentheses, and , ,  denote significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1% (similarly
hereinafter).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the RKSdatabase and CSMAR database.
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consistent with the existing literature (Baginski & Hassell, 1997). The higher book-to-
market ratio (BM) indicates a lower growth of the company, which causes managers
to issue a vague earnings forecast, and this is in accord with Cheng et al. (2013). The
regression coefficient on LOSS is positive at the 1% significance level, indicating that
managers have a clearer estimate of the company’s operating loss status. The regres-
sion coefficient on HORIZON is significantly negative, which conforms to our intu-
ition, suggesting that the closer the managers’ forecast time is to the fiscal period end
date, the higher the forecast precision will be. The regression coefficient on
ANNUAL is negative at the 1% significance level, which indicates the precision of
management annual forecasts is lower than that of quarterly and semi-annual fore-
casts. Additionally, the regression coefficient of SOE is significantly positive, suggest-
ing that the precision of earnings forecasts issued by state-owned companies is higher
than that of non-state-owned ones. The regression coefficient on INST is negative,
which points out that firms with more institutional investors are prone to release less
precise earnings forecasts. The regression coefficients of other control variables in the
model are not statistically significant, which is similar to the findings of existing lit-
erature, such as Li and Zhang (2015), Cheng et al. (2013), Ajinkya et al. (2005), and
Karamanou and Vafeas (2005).
5.4. Robustness tests
To make our results more stable, we carry out the following robustness tests. First,
we change the measurement of our independent variable, CSR. In this part, CSR data
is taken from the CSR research database of listed firms in China, which comes from
the CSMAR database. Following Sial et al. (2018), we use the number of disclosure
items in the CSR report as the alternative CSR measurement. There are 11 CSR
reporting items summarized by the CSMAR CSR database. Specifically, we divide the
number of items contained in the CSR report of each company by a total of 11 items,
and the value obtained is the first alternative measurement of CSR performance. The
regression result is demonstrated in column (1) of Table 5. Additionally, we take the
logarithm of the number of disclosure items in each CSR reporting as the second
alternative measurement of CSR performance, and the regression result is listed in
column (2) of Table 5. As seen in Table 5, CSR is still significantly and positively
associated with management forecast precision. Multiple measurement approaches
can effectively avoid defects in a single evaluation index that may not accurately and
fully assess the CSR performance of public firms.
Second, as mentioned above, management earnings forecasts of listed companies
in China are semi-mandatory, so our sample includes voluntary disclosure subsample
and mandatory disclosure subsample. Considering the difference in disclosure motiv-
ation between mandatory disclosures and voluntary disclosures, the information qual-
ity of these two kinds of earnings forecasts is likely to be different. Hence, we divide
the entire sample into two groups: the voluntary disclosure subsample and the man-
datory disclosure subsample and conduct regression analysis on them, respectively.
Table 6 displays the regression results of two separate groups. We can see that the
significant positive relation between CSR and earnings forecast precision remains
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unchanged whether the disclosure is voluntary or mandatory. However, in the volun-
tary disclosure sample, the role of CSR is greater than that in the mandatory sample.
This fully illustrates that those firms that attach more importance to CSR tend to vol-
untarily disclose earnings forecasts and strive to improve the disclosure quality to
maintain the established reputation effect of CSR.
5.5. Endogeneity issue
Our paper may encounter with the potential endogeneity problem due to omitted
variables or reverse causality. Although we follow previous literature and have con-
trolled as many variables as possible, including the firm characteristics, management
earnings forecast features, and corporate governance factors, both the dependent vari-
able PRECISE and our main independent variable CSR may still be jointly affected by
some unknown factors that are not captured in this paper. In regard to the reverse
causality issue, one may argue that the higher management earnings forecast







































Note: T-values are reported in parentheses, and , ,  denotesignificance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the RKSdatabase and CSMAR database.
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precision may yield higher market returns and lower financing costs according to the
classic information disclosure literature, thereby increasing the company’s financial
capacity to implement more CSR activities. In order to address the possible endoge-
neity issue in this paper, we follow Cheng et al.,(2014) and introduce two instrumen-
tal variables named MPSCSR and MPYCSR, which are measured by the average CSR
level of each provincial-sector pair and each provincial-year pair respectively.
The reason for selecting the above instrumental variables is that both the provin-
cial-sector pairs and provincial-year pairs might affect the focal firm (Cheng et al.,
2014; Marquis et al., 2007), but no clear evidence supports that one firm’s CSR per-
formance can influence the average CSR level of provincial firms or sector firms.
These features indicate that the two instrumental variables are suitable to be used in
two-stage least squares regression (2SLS).
As shown in Table 7, the results of the first stage of 2SLS regression are repre-
sented in the first column, and both MPSCSR and MPYCSR are positively related to
CSR performance at the 1% significance level. The second stage results of 2SLS
Table 6. Voluntary disclosure and mandatory disclosure.






































Note: T-values are reported in parentheses, and , ,  denotesignificance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the RKSdatabase and CSMAR database.
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regression are listed in column (2) of Table 7, and a significantly positive coefficient
on Instrumented CSR is observed (0.004, t¼ 3.5803). The 2SLS analysis results show
the positive relationship between instrumented CSR and earnings forecast precision
remains significant. In this light, to some extent, we consider that the endogeneity
issue does not affect our main results.
5.6. Further analysis
China’s institutional environment and transitional economic system have created the
dual separation of the non-state-owned and state-owned nature of listed companies,
which results in significant dissimilarities between non-SOEs and SOEs in many
aspects. As compared to non-SOEs, China’s SOEs are often under a more sound and











































Note: T-values are reported in parentheses, and , ,  denotesignificance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the RKSdatabase and CSMAR database.
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effective internal and external supervision mechanisms, which largely determines the
higher quality of the financial disclosure of SOEs. Moreover, in China, SOEs have
easier access to financing, including equity and debt financing, and governments are
more inclined to bail out SOEs when they run into financial distress (Chen et al.,
2010; Gordon & Li, 2003; Sapienza, 2004), which gives them less incentive to
manipulate earnings upwards. Previous studies have also found that state-owned
listed firms have higher information transparency and a lower degree of information
asymmetry, and they make more voluntary information disclosures (Ferguson et al.,
2002; Huang et al., 2017; Luo & Zhu, 2010; Masanori, 2010). By contrast, non-SOEs
perform less well in terms of corporate governance and have serious asymmetric
information problems (Masanori, 2010). Especially in countries with weak property
rights protection, non-SOEs exhibit lower levels of information transparency to pre-
vent the government’s expropriation (Bushman et al., 2004; Durnev et al., 2009).
Tang et al. (2017) suggest that the suspicion of the ‘original sin’ of private entrepre-
neurs gives rise to the lower transparency and earnings quality of private enterprises
in China. Consequently, we consider that when the information disclosure of state-
owned firms is of high quality, CSR may not play a strong role in improving manage-
ment forecast precision. On the other hand, since non-SOEs generally have lower
transparency in their disclosure practices, the roles of CSR in affecting disclosure
quality are likely to be more prominent; that is, the relationship between CSR and
the precision of management earnings forecasts may be stronger in non-SOEs. To
test our prediction, the sample of our paper is classified into SOEs subsample and
non-SOEs subsample, and we estimate each subsample separately.
In addition, to further explore whether corporate ownership affects the relationship
between CSR and earnings forecast precision, this paper adds the interaction term of
CSR and corporate ownership type (CSR SOE) based on model (1) and form the
following model (2) to investigate the moderating effect of corporate ownership.
PRECISE ¼ b0 þ b1CSRþ b2CSR SOE þ b3SOEþ b4SIZEþ b5BM þ b6LEV þ b7ROA
þ b8LOSSþ b9VOLRþ b10RETURN þ b11COVERþ b12HORIZON
þ b13ANNUALþ b14NEWSþ b15DUALþ b16INDRþ b17INST
þ INDUSTRY þ YEARþ e
(2)
The first two columns of Table 8 reveal the regression results grouped by corporate
ownership type, and the third column shows the regression results after adding the
interaction item between CSR and SOE. According to the grouped regression results,
we find that in non-SOEs, CSR plays a greater part in raising management earnings
forecast precision than in state-owned companies, which is consistent with our
expectation. Furthermore, we are concerned about the coefficient of the interaction
term (CSR SOE). As we expected, the regression coefficient on CSR SOE is sig-
nificantly negative at the 1% statistical level, indicating a weaker positive relation
between CSR and the precision of earnings forecasts for SOEs than for non-SOEs.
Our finding also means that compared with SOEs, the CSR orientation of non-SOEs
can promote the quality of management forecasts to a greater extent. This is probably
due to the argument that the information disclosure quality of SOEs is inherently
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high, so the role of CSR in information disclosure is not as strong, while China’s pri-
vate enterprises need to strengthen CSR orientation to improve the quality of infor-
mation disclosure owing to their poor information disclosure practices.
6. Discussion and conclusion
Although a growing amount of literature studies the influence of CSR on the infor-
mation quality based on historical financial reports, there is little concern about
whether CSR could affect the quality of financial disclosure regarding future earnings
forecasts. However, the precision of management earnings forecasts directly influences
the quality and usefulness of forward-looking information disclosure and can also
fully reflect managers’ social responsibility to provide transparent information to their
stakeholders. Against this backdrop, we mainly examine the relation between CSR
and the earnings forecast quality represented by forecast precision. Following
Table 8. The mediating effect of firms’ ownership.
Variables SOEs Non–SOEs Full sample






SIZE –0.032 –0.008 –0.016
(–3.598) (–1.094) (–2.973)
BM –0.044 –0.205 –0.084
(–1.686) (–6.619) (–4.384)
LEV 0.116 –0.101 –0.010
(2.716) (–2.721) (–0.350)
ROA –0.193 0.143 –0.056
(–1.223) (1.284) (–0.603)
LOSS 0.049 0.094 0.062
(2.553) (4.072) (4.308)
VOLR 0.088 1.160 0.771
(0.108) (1.938) (1.571)
RETURN 0.009 0.003 0.017
(0.515) (0.260) (1.677)
COVER 0.000 –0.018 0.000
(0.050) (–2.884) (0.073)
HORIZON 0.000 –0.001 –0.001
(–2.157) (–4.119) (–4.85)
ANNUAL –0.090 –0.032 –0.065
(–7.635) (–3.407) (–8.532)
NEWS 0.004 0.003 0.002
(0.377) (0.308) (0.342)
DUAL 0.034 –0.013 0.006
(1.649) (–1.303) (0.638)
INDR 0.030 0.124 0.099
(0.251) (1.517) (1.455)
INST –0.089 –0.100 –0.068
(–1.889) (–1.178) (–1.727)
CONSTANT 0.531 –0.162 0.046
(2.868) (–1.092) (0.400)
N 2276 2916 5192
ADJ-R2 10.44% 28.2% 15.16%
F-value 5.738 19.768 15.274
Note: T-values are reported in parentheses, and , ,  denotesignificance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the RKSdatabase and CSMAR database.
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stakeholder theory and agency theory, we propose two competing hypotheses, i.e., the
transparent forecast hypothesis and the opportunistic forecast hypothesis. Through
empirical research, we find a significantly positive link between the firm’s CSR per-
formance and management forecast precision. This finding lends support to our
transparent forecast hypothesis, which indicates high-quality information disclosure is
responsible and ethical behavior in the interaction and communication between cor-
porate executives and external stakeholders. Our result ties in with the viewpoints
based on stakeholder theory, i.e., that a company’s consideration of its stakeholders’
interests has a positive impact on corporate information disclosures, and CSR-ori-
ented companies are more diligent and accountable in the production and disclosure
of financial information to serve the needs of various stakeholders.
The research conclusion of this paper is that firms performing well in terms of
CSR will exhibit high-quality financial disclosure, that is, issue high-precision earn-
ings forecasts. This is mainly due to the following reasons. CSR orientation is associ-
ated with a good corporate reputation for ethical behavior, limiting the likelihood of
managers’ opportunistic use of CSR activities. Many socially responsible companies
have realized the great value that good corporate reputations can bring them, so they
will continue to forge a transparent reputation in information disclosures to enhance
the value creation effect of reputation.
Furthermore, in the light of China’s institutional background, we find the relation-
ship between CSR performance and the precision of earnings forecasts to be stronger
in non-state-owned enterprises, which suggests that CSR plays a greater role in
enhancing management forecast precision for non-SOEs than SOEs. This result is
probably because, compared with SOEs, non-SOEs have lower information transpar-
ency and consequently, firms’ CSR orientation can play a greater role in information
disclosure practices. By taking ownership type into consideration, we extend the
understanding of how corporate ownership affects the role of CSR. This finding also
has certain implications for the establishment and improvement of the information
disclosure regulatory system for capital markets in China and other transi-
tional economies.
Our research offers strong empirical evidence that the management in CSR-ori-
ented firms acts in an accountable way by providing more precise earnings forecasts
that represent more transparent and informative forecasts. Existing studies on CSR
and managerial behavior can come down to a basic argument about whether the
management is inherently moral or opportunistic in the face of social responsibility
engagement. Thus, this article makes a contribution to this discussion by presenting
compelling evidence that the ethical concerns and reputation effects of CSR are likely
to be the driving factors for managers to provide high-quality information disclosure,
which supports the stakeholder theory. Moreover, our study also suggests that manag-
ers’ awareness of CSR can exert great influence on their discretionary decision (e.g.,
the precision of earnings forecasts), and this result is helpful for information users to
evaluate the transparency and informativeness of corporate information disclosures.
Finally, our findings also facilitate policymakers and regulators to better understand
the business behaviors and disclosure practices of listed companies under the guid-
ance of CSR orientation.
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Like previous studies, this article inevitably has several limitations. Firstly, due to
the difficulties in data acquisition, our sample is only restricted to Chinese listed
firms, which may limit the generalizability of our conclusions. Secondly, we only
focus on management forecast precision, and other quality characteristics are not
involved. In future studies, we might adopt international samples to expand the cur-
rent research. Moreover, we can also explore the connection between CSR and other
quality characteristics of earnings forecasts, such as management forecast bias, fore-
cast consistency, forecast credibility and so on.
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